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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of preserving
information flow security in Event-B specification models and
during the process of refining an abstract specification to
be more concrete. A typed Event-B model is presented to
enforce information flow security. We then present an approach
to the problem of preserving information flow properties
under abstraction refinement. The novelty of the approach is
that we formalise refinement transformation in terms of the
mathematical concept of Galois connection for the purpose
of information-flow analysis and control. That is, the state-
invariant and state-transition predicates of the models are
used to generate the Galois connection. We show how the
refinement transformation ensures to preserve the security
properties during the development steps from the beginning
abstract-level specification to a concrete implementation.
Keywords-Flow; Security; Specification; Event-B; Type Sys-
tem; Refinement
I. I NTRODUCTION
Information flow analysis is a fundamental issue in pre-
serving confidentiality and discovering security leaks in
software systems. Information flow control analyses the
programs and try to discover potential illegal flows and guar-
antee that no unauthorised flow can occur. In software de-
velopment, it is important to concern security related issue
from the very beginning,e.g. abstract-level specifications.
Refinement is a relation on specifications that formalises th
process of stepwise development to achieve a more concrete
version. A security-concern stepwise development requires
to preserve the security properties of interest during the
development steps, until a concrete specification is achieved.
It is therefore required to have a corresponding theory to
ensure that the transformation from the abstract level to the
more concrete level preserves the security properties of the
abstract levels.
In this paper, we consider secure information flow analysis
for systems in a specification language, Event-B. Event-
B [1], [2] is a general purpose specification language used
for the abstract design and detailed development of safety
systems. We present security typing rules for a core Event-
B model which can be used to control secure information
flow. The model variables are typed into different security
levels in an information flow lattice [3]. The typing rules for
model events can prevent unauthorised information to flow
in an abstract machine given a flow security policy. We focus
on systems in which secrets are stored in model variables.
Security labels are associated with variables indicating the
intended secrecy of the contents. The security labels form
a finite flow lattice L with a partial ordering⊑sec. For
example, the simplest case is that the security labels partition
into two sets: high (H) denoting secret and low (L) denoting
public. A partial ordering,L ⊑sec H , implies that the
only permitted information flow is fromL to H , i.e., no-
flowing-down. We say a system is secure if it satisfies an
applied security flow policy, for example, the well known
non-interference property [4]. A system isnon-interfering
if it is not possible for an outside observer to gain any
knowledge about the presence ofhigh labels in the original
run (the observer only seeslow labels). The security problem
is therefore to verify that there is no dependency between
the initial value of the high labels and the final value of the
low labels. Specifically, every reachablestateof the system
during the development steps should satisfy the basic non-
interference property. In this paper, we are generally talking
about a no-flowing-down security property denoted asφsec
rather than a specified property such as non-interference.
Furthermore, in Event-B, systems are developed using
refinement: the system is first described as a simple ab-
stract specification and then is refined stepwise to be a
more concrete implementation. Such hierarchical specifica-
tion approach may introduce information security violations
during the stepwise development, even if each abstract-level
specification of the system keeps sound information flow
control. In order to avoid this, it is required to investigate
how the transitions from the specification (higher level of ab-
straction) to the implementation (lower level of abstraction)
of a system,i.e. refinements between abstraction levels, can
be done in order to preserve the flow security properties.
We introduce a novel method to formalise the refinement
transformation between the abstract model and a relatively
concrete one in terms of the mathematical concept of Galois
connection. Such connection between the abstract models
ensures that the stepwise refinement preserves the security
propertyφsec.
The contributions of the paper are summarised as follows:
we present typing rules for the core Event-B model with
information flow control; we give semantic interpretation of
transformations and propose a mechanism to preserve the
security properties of interests under stepwise refinements
by making Galois connections between abstract machines;
we also study the security relationships between different
levels of abstract machines during verticalrefinements.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents the core Event-B model and the typing rules for the
model with secure information flow control. In Section III,
we investigate the problem of preserving security properties
under refinement, and present some formal results w.r.t. the
secure refinement. Section IV presents the related work in
information flow control for specification and programming
languages. The final Section summarises our work and
presents directions for future research.
II. T HE EVENT-B MODEL WITH INFORMATION FLOW
CONTROL
In general, the development of a B model follows an
incremental procedure validated by the refinement. A sys-
tem is modelled by a sequence of models related by the
refinement. In this paper, we use Event-B as our basis to
investigate secure information flow analysis in specifications
and refinement. Specifically, we define the security type
environment as:Γ : VAR → L, where VAR is a set of model
variables, andL is the security flow lattice. Intuitively, we
assign a security type to each model variable. The set of the
security types forms a security flow lattice denoted byL.
The actions of the model events can cause information flows
from variables with a higher level to (observed) variables
with a lower level. Clearly, such flows can cause information
leakage and should not be allowed. We therefore define
typing rules to the predicates and expression operators of
the model to ensure such unauthorised flows are forbidden,
and argue a basic predicate must satisfy its security typing
rules.
A. The Model and its Security Type System
An Event-B model normally consists of a set ofvariables
constituting the state of the model, ani variant that
describes the valid states, and a set ofeventsthat describes
the transformation of the state of the model. The model can
also use acontext machinewith constantandsetdefinitions.
We focus on a core structure of Event B in this paper.
The model. The core Event-B model is defined as a tuple
M = (m,VAR, I,EVT) wherem is thenameof the model,
VAR is a sequence of distinct modelvariables, I is a model
invariant limiting the possible states of VAR, EVT is a set
of modelevents.
An event is a guarded commandand composed by
a guards G(VAR) and a generalised substitutionaction
A(VAR). We consider the events in the following form:
EVT , when G(VAR) then A(VAR)
where action denoted asA are used to change the state of a
machine. Intuitively, thesubstitutionactions in the semantics
of events can be viewed as a set of state-based predicate
transformers. The effect of an action defines abefore-after
predicatewhich describes the relationship between the state
before and after the action has occurred. A state is a map
from VAR to their values. In an Event-B model, a state
consists of a sequence of variables that are modified by
events. The state space of an Event B model is therefore
modelled as the Cartesian product of the state of the vari-
ables,i.e., variablesv1, . . . , vn having stateσ1, . . . , σn give
the state space:Σ = σ1 × . . . × σn, whereσi , vi 7→ N.
The substitution actions of the core Event-B model include:
ACTION ::= skip
∣
∣
∣
∣
x := E x :∈ S z : |P x, y := E,F
The event actions can be viewed as transformation functions
which update the model state. Specifically,
• Null action:skip denotes the empty set of actions for
an event, the state is unchanged under theskip action;
• Assignment:x := E denotes the assignment,i.e., state
is updated by replacing free occurrences ofx by E:
where x ⊆ VAR is a sequence of variables, andE
denotes a number of set-theoretic expressions corre-
sponding to each of the variables inx;
• Choice from the set:x :∈ S denotes that we update the
state by arbitrarily choosing values from the setS for
the variables inx, i.e., x becomes a member ofS;
• Choice by predicate:x : |P denotes that we update the
state by arbitrarily choosing values for the variables in
x that satisfy the predicateP , i.e.,x becomes such that
the predicateP holds;
• Multiple action: x, y := E,F denotes concurrent
assignment of the valuesE and F to the variable
sequencesx andy respectively.
Type checking for flow security.At each abstract level, all
entities are built from a set of events. Each event is defined
in terms of substitution actions on model variables. Each
variable is assigned a security level. The powerset of model
variables therefore forms a complete latticeL, where the
partial ordering is regarding to the security levels of the
model variables:∀v1, v2 ∈ VAR, v1  v2 iff τ1 ⊑sec τ2,
where denotes the partial ordering on VAR, andτ1, τ2 ∈ L
denote the security levels of variablesv1 andv2 respectively.
Event action causes information to flow among variables.
Secure information flow can be described by a secure
information flow predicate in a way of typing rules. Let
L be the finite flow lattice.τ ⊆ L denotes a sequence of
security levels inL regarding to a sequencex of variables
with same length:|τ | = |x|. Following the style of type
system presented in [5], [6], we define the security typing
environment as:Γ : VAR → L. In a model event, for
an actionA, judgements have the form:τ ⊢, where the
type τ denotes the counter level of the variable sequence
x regarding to the actionA(x) being executed to eliminate
implicit flows from theguard, Γ andΓ′ describe the security
levels of the identifiers which hold before and after the exe-
cution ofA. Furthermore, model events can influence each
other and introduce information flows. It is also necessary
to look at the sequential ordering between model events,
which might introduce data dependence between events and
therefore introduce information flows as a result. Intuitively,
the dependency between two events can be introduced in the
following situation. Thebefore-after predicateof an event
EVT1 can enable another event EVT2 if the state of the
model after executing EVT1 makes the guard of EVT2 be
true and the action of EVT2 will be executed in succession.
Definition 1: [Dependency between events.]
Let EVT1 and EVT2 be two model events,
and: EVT1 , when G1(VAR) then A1(VAR),
EVT2 , when G2(VAR) then A2(VAR). For i ∈ {1, 2},
let I denote the model invariant,Gi denotes the guard of
event EVTi, Ai denotes the action of event EVTi, andΨi
denotes thebefore-after predicaterelating EVTi. Say EVT2
depends on EVT1, written as:(EVT1 ⊲ EVT2), iff:
if I(VAR) ∧G1(VAR) then :
[[A1]]
(
Ψ1(σ(VAR), σ′(VAR)
)
⇔
(
G2(VAR) = true ∧ [[A2]]
(
Ψ2(σ(VAR), σ
′(VAR))
))
.
PredicateΨi(σ(VAR), σ′(VAR)) means that the before and
after state defined of EVTi areσ andσ′ respectively.[[A]]Ψ
means that executing actionA produces a predicateΨ.
We present the security typing rules for specifying security
information flow predicates of events in Table I. Notation
Γ ⊢ E : t denotes that under type environmentΓ, expression
E has typet. The type of an expression (including guard
expression) is defined by taking the least upper bound of the
types of its free variables:
Γ ⊢ E : t iff t =
⊔
v∈fv(E)
Γ(v)
The notationτ ⊔ τ ′ is defined as follows.
Definition 2: For a sequence of variables denoted as
x = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉, τ = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 defines a sequence
of security levels ofx, i.e., τ(v1) = t1, . . . , τ(vn) = tn
whereτ(vi) denotes the security level of variablevi for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Similarly, τ ′ = 〈t′1, . . . , t
′
n〉 defines a se-
quence security levels ofx as:τ ′(v1) = t′1, . . . , τ
′(vn) = t
′
n.
We therefore defineτ ⊔ τ ′ as:τ ⊔ τ ′ = 〈t1 ⊔ t′1, . . . tn ⊔ t
′
n〉
regarding to the variable sequence:x = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉.
Definition 3: We define that the basic predicate of EVT:
Ψ , Γ{EVT}Γ′, satisfies the flow security properties, writ-
ten as:Γ{EVT}Γ′ ⊢ φsec, i.e., Ψ ⊢ φsec iff for all σ′, σ:
∀v ∈ VAR.
(
Ψ(σ(v), σ′(v)) =⇒ eitherΓ′(v) ⊏sec Γ(v)
)
or σ′(v) = σ(v)
whereΨ(σ(v), σ′(v)) denotes that the predicate by perform-
ing EVT will update the current stateσ(v) to be σ′(v)
regarding to a variablev.
Definition 4: For any E1 ⊲ E2 ⊲ . . . ⊲ En
(n ∈ N), consider the relevant sequential of predicates
〈Ψi(σi−1(VAR), σi(VAR))|i ∈ {1 . . . n}〉 regarding to
〈Ei|i ∈ {1 . . . n}〉. We say a modelM is secure, written
as:M ⊢ φsec, iff, for each predicateΨ of M :
Ψ(σ0(VAR), σn(VAR)) ⊢ φsec holds.
Theorem 1:The security type system presented in Table
I for the Event-B model is sound w.r.t. the security condition
defined in Definition 3, 4.
Proof: We need to prove for any event EVT and their
sequences with predicatesΨ of the model, the following
holds: ∀v ∈ VAR,Ψ(σ(v), σ′(v)) ⇒ Γ′(v) ⊑sec Γ(v).
Γ′(v) ⊑sec Γ(v) implies that EVT contains no substitution
to v with a higher security level expression. Specifically, the
rules ensures that for each semantic action, we take the least
upper bound of the security settings before and after of the
defined variables,i.e.,Γ′ ⊒sec Γ. Together with the security
condition, this ensure that for allΨ(σ′(v),Ψ(σ(v))), either
Γ′(v) ⊏sec Γ(v) or σ′(v) = σ(v).
Example 1:Let us look at a simple example. Assume we
have two events defined as follows:
EVT1 , when true then l, h := 0, 2 end
EVT2 , when l ≤ h then l := l + 1 end
where model variables{l, h} ⊆ VAR, the security lev-
els of l, h are τ1, τ2 respectively, andτ1 ⊑sec τ2.
Clearly, Ψ1(σ(l 7→ 0, h 7→ 0), σ′(l 7→ 0, h 7→ 2)),
andΨ2(σ′(l 7→ 0, h 7→ 2), σ′(l 7→ 1, h 7→ 2)). According to
Definition 1, it is clear that EVT1 can enable the execution
of EVT2, we have: EVT1 ⊲ EVT2, the guard(l ≤ h) causes
an implicit flow with a counted levelτ1 ⊔ τ2, and therefore:
Γ{EVT1}Γ′(l 7→ τ1, h 7→ τ2)
Γ′{EVT2}Γ′′(l 7→ τ1 ⊔ τ2, h 7→ τ2)
Γ{EVT1 ⊲ EVT2}Γ′′(l 7→ τ2, h 7→ τ2)
Note thatΓ′′(l) 6⊑sec Γ(l) implies that the system violates
the flow property.
III. PRESERVINGSECURITY PROPERTIES UNDER
REFINEMENT
In general, an Event-B component concerns the devel-
opment of software models and includesabstract machine,
refinement, concrete machine. In this section, we investigate
the problem of how to check the specification is consistent
with the flow policy and the security properties are preserved
under the refinement. Specifically, we are interested in the
vertical refinement between a higher level abstract machine
and a relatively concrete one.
As standard, we say a system specification modelM ′
is a refinement of a system specification modelM if and
only if M ′ ⊑ref M . Intuitively, M ′ is more accurate or
less abstract thanM . M is secure if the events satisfy the
security properties which are guarded by the typing rules
(TSub)
τ1 ⊢ Γ1{EVT}Γ′1
τ2 ⊢ Γ2{EVT}Γ′2
τ2 ⊑sec τ1, Γ2 ⊑sec Γ1, Γ′1 ⊑sec Γ
′
2
(TDepEvts)
Γ0{EVT1}Γ1 Γ1{EVT2}Γ2 . . . Γn−1{EVTn}Γn
Γ{EVT1 ⊲ EVT2 ⊲ . . . ⊲ EVTn}Γn
(TSkip)
τ ⊢ Γ{skip}Γ
(TAssign) Γ ⊢ E : τ
′
τ ⊢ Γ{x := E}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TChoiceFromSet)
t =
⊔
s∈S
Γ(s) τ ′ = 〈t, . . . , t〉 ∧ |τ ′| = |x|
τ ⊢ Γ{x :∈ S}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TChoiceByPredicate)
Γ ⊢ P : τ ′ =
⊔
v∈fv(P ) Γ(v)
τ ⊢ Γ{x : |P}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TMultipleAction)
Γ ⊢ E : τ1 Γ ⊢ F : τ2
τ ⊢ Γ{x, y := E,F}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ1, y 7→ τ ⊔ τ2)
(x ∩ y = ∅)
Γ ⊢ E : τ1 Γ ⊢ F : τ2
τ ⊢ Γ{x, y := E,F}
Γ′
(
{vi} 7→ τ({vi}) ⊔ τ1({vi}) ⊔ τ2({vi}),
x \ {vi} 7→ τ(x \ {vi}) ⊔ τ1(x \ {vi}),
y \ {vi} 7→ τ(y \ {vi}) ⊔ τ2(y \ {vi})
)
(x ∩ y = {vi}) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Table I
TYPING RULES FOR MODEL EVENTS WITH INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL.
defined in Table I. However, by the definition of refinement
there is no guarantee that a refinement ofM will preserve the
security properties since the refined model might introduce
new or merge existing events. Therefore, secure information
flow properties are not always preserved by refinement. One
can imagine that the reason for this is that the secure flow
properties and the relevant typing rules depends on the
semantics of events and the type environment, which can
not guarantee that the refinement transformation preserve
the security properties of interest. One can argue that the
security requirement can be viewed as security predicates,
however, some of the events and their actions that satisfies
the rules may be removed or merged during the refinement.
Therefore, proving the security property at one abstract level
is not enough in general. The lower level may introduce
behaviours that do not have any abstract equivalent at a
higher level. Relevant security properties must be proven
again at the concrete level or ensured via the refinement
transformation to guarantee that these additional behaviours
introduced via refinement do not violate security flow policy.
In this Section, we propose to study the problem of preserv-
ing security properties under refinement transformation.
A. Secure refinement rules
In the first step, we propose to present the secure refine-
ment rules of events in order to prove that a refinement
is both secure and correct. Refinement provides a way to
construct stronger invariants and add details in a way to en-
rich it step by step. This is generally achieved by extending
the list of state variables, by merging and refining existing
events, and by adding new events. Specifically, assume the
lower level model denoted byMC has a collection of state
variables denoted byvC , which is distinct from the collection
of variables denoted byvA in the abstract model denoted
by MA. The abstract variablesvA and the concrete onesvC
are linked together by means ofgluing invariantJ(vA, vC):
it “glues” the state of the concrete modelMC to that of
its abstractionMA. For any variable in abstract (concrete)
machine if there is no glued variable in the relevant concrete
(abstract) machine, we introduce a virtual variable denoted
by ⊥ to represent it,i.e., we extend the set of the variables
such that: VAR∗A = VARA∪{⊥}, and VAR
∗
C = VARC∪{⊥}.
Fig. 1 shows the idea of it. Furthermore, a variantV is
introduced to prevent executions “non-terminating”:V has
to decreased by everyconvergent eventand must not be
increased byanticipated events. Assume the type environ-
ments for abstract event and concrete event are denoted as
ΓA andΓC respectively. We extend the refinement laws to
incorporate rules w.r.t. security properties in Table II. For
clear cases, we useΨ(v, v′) to denote the before and after
states of variable(s)v instead of writingΨ(σ(v), σ′(v)).
• Rules (SubSec-REF) - (InvSec-REF) define the secure
refinement for existing events. We assume abstract
event EA with guard GA(vA) and before-and-after
predicateΨA(vA, v′A) in MA is refining to a relevant
concrete eventEC with guardGC(vC) and before-and-
(SubSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ ΓA ⊢ vA : τA ∧ ΓC ⊢ vC : τC =⇒ τC ⊑sec τA
(FisSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ GC(vC) ∧ ΓC ⊢ vC : τC ∧ Γ′C ⊢ v
′
C
: τ ′
C
=⇒ ∃v′
C
.ΨC(vC , v
′
C
) ∧ (τ ′
C
⊑sec τC)
(GrdSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ GC(vC) ∧ ΓC ⊢ GC(vC) : τC ∧ ΓA ⊢ GA(vA) : τA =⇒ GA(vA) ∧ (τC ⊑sec τA)
(InvSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ GC(vC) ∧ ΨC(vC , v′C) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC ,Γ
′
C
⊢ v′
C
: τ ′
C
) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ vA : τA,Γ
′
A
⊢ v′
A
: τ ′
A
)
=⇒ ∃v′
A
.(ΨA(vA, v
′
A
) ∧ J(v′
A
, v′
C
)) ∧ (τ ′
C
⊑sec τC ⊑sec τA) ∧ (τ
′
C
⊑sec τ ′A ⊑sec τA)
(MergeSec-REF) E , when G(v) then S(v) end ∧ F , when H(v) then S(v) end ∧ (τ ⊢ Γ{E}Γ′) ∧ (τ ⊢ Γ{F}Γ′′)
=⇒ EF , when G(v) ∨H(v) then S(v) end ∧ τ ⊢ Γ {EF} Γ′ ⊔ Γ′′ ∧ Γ′ ⊔ Γ′′ ⊑sec Γ
(NewEvtSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ GC(vC) ∧ ΨC(vC , v′C) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC ∧ Γ
′
C
⊢ v′
C
: τ ′
C
)
=⇒ J(vA, v
′
C
) ∧ (V (v′
C
) ∈ N ∧ (V (v′
C
) < V (vC))) ∧ τ
′
C
⊑sec τC
Table II
SECURE REFINEMENT RULES FOR EXISTING EVENTS.
Figure 1. Gluing Invariant
after predicateΨC(vC , v′C) in MC . Let τA ∈ LA be a
sequence of security levels of the sequence of variables
vA andτC ∈ LC be a sequence of security levels of the
sequence of variablesvC . we sayτC ⊑sec τA, iff :
∀va ∈ vA, vc ∈ vC , J(va, vc) ∈ J(vA, vC)
=⇒ τc ⊑sec τa.
Specifically, SubSec-REF ensures that for glued vari-
ables, the security level of variables in the concrete
event will not be higher than that of their glued vari-
ables in the abstract event. FisSec-REF ensures that the
refined event is feasible and there is no unauthorised
flow introduced by the before-after predicate. GrdSec-
REF and InvSec-REF ensure that the concrete event is
a correctly refined event regarding to the abstract one
and the security level of the corresponding variables
will not be higher than that of the glued ones in the
abstract event. Note that for any variablev, the security
level of an “empty” variable⊥ is never higher than its
“glued” variablev, i.e., τ(⊥) ⊑sec τ(v).
• Rule (MergeSec-REF) specifies the secure refinement
for merging existing events. Several abstract events can
be merged being refined to a single concrete event. For
eventE andF , EF defines the refinement of merging
E and F , and the security typing rule ensures the
security environment ofEF (after the refinement of
mergingE andF ) be the least upper bound of that of
E andF . The notationΓ′ ⊔ Γ′′ is defined as:
∀v ∈ VAR, (Γ′ ⊢ v : τ ′) ∧ (Γ′′ ⊢ v : τ ′′)
⇒ (Γ′ ⊔ Γ′′ ⊢ v : τ ′ ⊔ τ ′′)
• New events might be introduced in a refinement. The
rule (NewEvSec-REF) ensures that adding new event
during the refinement will not introduce secure in-
formation flow and be correct. As usual, each new
event refines an implicitskip event which satisfies the
security typing rules, and the non-divergence rule.
B. Secure Refinements as Galois Connections
In the second step, we propose to introduce a method to
definesecure transformation functionbetween abstract mod-
els under refinement. To investigate the common refinement
relation that can be obtained between an abstract model and
a relevant concrete model, we explore the idea of making
Galois connection between them. First let us review the basic
definition of Galois connection [7].
Definition 5: Let P = (P,P ) and Q = (Q,Q) be
posets, and supposef∗ : P → Q andf∗ : Q → P are a pair
of functions such that∀p ∈ P and∀q ∈ Q,
f∗(p) Q q iff p P f
∗(q)
then the pair(f∗, f∗) form a Galois connectionbetweenP
and Q. If (f∗, f∗) is such a connection,f∗ is said to be
the left adjoint of the correspondingf∗, andf∗ is the right
adjoint of f∗.
Definition 6 presents a relationship between the abstract
model and a relevant refined model regarding to the predi-
cates and security properties.
Definition 6: For a given Event-B modelM , let ϕ be a
predicate w.r.t. a variablev of M , Ψ be the set of predicates
w.r.t. the set of the model variables VAR of M , M ′ be
a refined model ofM : M ′ ⊑ref M , ϕ′ be a predicate
w.r.t. variablev′ of M which is gluing tov: J(v, v′), Ψ′
be the set of predicates of the set of the model variables
VAR′ of M ′. Then:
• if ϕ ⊢ φsec ⇒ ϕ′ ⊢ φsec, then we writeϕ′ |= ϕ;
• we sayΨ′ |= Ψ iff
∀(v ∈ VAR ∧ v′ ∈ VAR′ ∧ J(v, v′)) : ϕ′ |= ϕ.
The Galois Connection. We propose to make a Galois
connection between an abstract modelMA and a relevant
refined concrete modelMC . For cases without introducing
confusion, we say the Galois connection between the models
MA and MC rather than between their sate spaces of
variables. Specifically, the refinement betweenMA andMC
can be viewed as a paired function:MA(f∗, f∗)MC , where
f∗ denotes a concretisation function fromMA to MC and
defines the interpretation fromMA to lower level MC ;
while f∗ denotes the abstraction function fromMC to MA,
and defines the interpretation fromMC to MA. Remember
that each model is a state transformer via transformation
functions. Let[[·]]A denote the semantic substitution function
under abstract machineMA, and [[·]]C denote the semantic
substitution function under concrete machineMC . Diagram-
matically, Fig. 2 shows an intuitive connection betweenMA
andMC .
Figure 2. Connection between abstract models under refinemet
Formally, we present the definition of the connection as
follows.
Definition 7: Let MA be a higher level model,MC be a
lower level model,ΨA be the set of predicates ofMA, ΨC
be the set of predicates ofMC , and notationP(X) denotes
powerset of setX as standard. Then put:
• the powerset of the predicates set ofMA forms a lattice
with a partial ordering on subset relations⊆A, we
write: MA = (P(ΨA),⊆A), where⊆A denotes the
subsetrelation onP(ΨA);
• similarly, we write: MC = (P(ΨC),⊆C), where⊆C
denotes thesubsetrelation onP(ΨC);
• for α ⊆ ΨA, define:
f∗(α) = {ϕc | ∀ϕa(ϕa ∈ α → ϕc |= ϕa)};
• for β ⊆ ΨC, define:
f∗(β) = {ϕa | ∀ϕc(ϕc ∈ β → ϕc |= ϕa)}.
Paired function(f∗, f∗) thus build a connection between an
abstract modelMA and a refined modelMC .
Theorem 2:Refinement function(f∗, f∗) defined in Def-
inition 7 forms a Galois connection betweenMA andMC .
Proof: According to the definition of Galois connection,
to prove(f∗, f∗) forming a Galois connection is equivalent
to prove the following equivalence:
∀β ⊆ ΨC , α ⊆ ΨA : f∗(β) ⊆A α iff β ⊆C f
∗(α).
Let ≡ denote “equivalent to”, we have:
β ⊆C f
∗(α) ≡ {ϕc | ∀ϕa(ϕa ∈ α → ϕc |= ϕa)} ⊇C β
≡ (∀ϕc ∈ β)(∀ϕa ∈ α)ϕc |= ϕa
≡ (∀ϕa ∈ α)(∀ϕc ∈ β)ϕc |= ϕa
≡ {ϕa | ∀ϕc(ϕc ∈ β → ϕc |= ϕa)} ⊆A α
≡ f∗(β) ⊆A α
Therefore, the refinement connection(f∗, f∗) betweenMA
andMC forms a Galois connection.
Galois connections has important properties which relate
them to the underlying ordered structures. The following the-
orem shows that any three abstract models under refinement
built via two Galois connections with matching pre-orders
can be composed.
Theorem 3:Let us consider the following abstract models
under refinement:M1 = (P(Ψ1),⊆1), M2 = (P(Ψ2),⊆2),
andM3 = (P(Ψ3),⊆3), and:M3 ⊑ref M2 ⊑ref M1. Let
(f∗, f∗) be the Galois connection betweenM1 and M2,
(g∗, g∗) be the Galois connection betweenM2 andM3. Then
(f∗ ◦ g∗, g∗ ◦ f∗) is a Galois connection betweenM1 and
M3.
Proof: By assumption and Definition 5, forα ⊆ Ψ1,
β ⊆ Ψ2, andγ ⊆ Ψ3, we have:
G1 : f∗(β) ⊆1 α iff β ⊆2 f
∗(α),
and
G2 : g∗(γ) ⊆2 β iff γ ⊆3 g
∗(β).
By G2, we have:
g∗(γ) ⊆2 β ⊆2 f
∗(α) iff γ ⊆3 g
∗(β) ⊆3 g
∗(f∗(α)) (1)
By G1, we have:
f∗(g∗(γ)) ⊆1 f∗(β) ⊆1 α iff g∗(γ) ⊆2 β ⊆2 f
∗(α) (2)
By (1) and (2), we obtain what we want:
f∗(g∗(γ)) ⊆1 α iff γ ⊆3 g
∗(f∗(α))
Theorem 4:Let MC andMA be two abstract models, and
MC ⊑ref MA, then:MA ⊢ φsec =⇒ MC ⊢ φsec.
Proof: By Definition 4, MA ⊢ φsec implies for any
predicate setΨA of MA: ΨA ⊢ φsec.
By Definition 3, we have:
∀(va ∈ VARA, vc ∈ VARC , J(va, vc)).ϕc |= ϕa (3)
whereϕc ∈ ΨC denotes the predicate w.r.t.vc, andϕa ∈ ΨA
denotes the predicate w.r.t.va.
On the other hand, forα ⊆ ΨA, according to Definition 7:
f∗(α) = {ϕc | ∀ϕa(ϕa ∈ α → ϕc |= ϕa)} (4)
By (3), (4), we have:
∀ϕa ∈ ΨA.f
∗(ϕa) ⊢ φsec, i.e., ∀ϕc ∈ ΨC .ϕc ⊢ φsec.
This implies, for any predicate setΨC of MC, we have:
ΨC ⊢ φsec. By Definition 4, we then obtain:MC ⊢ φsec.
Theorem 4 implies that the refinement transformation pre-
serve the security properties of interests,i.e., if the abstract
machineMA is secure andMA(f∗, f∗)MC, then the relevant
MC is secure as well.
Corollary 1: AssumeMn ⊑ref . . . ⊑ref M2 ⊑ref M1,
n ∈ N, then:M1 ⊢ φsec =⇒ Mn ⊢ φsec.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 3 and 4
by induction.
IV. RELATED WORK
This paper relates to the topic of security information
flow control in specification languages. The notion of secure
information flow specifies the security requirements of the
system where should be no information flow from the datum
to the observer. Information flow control in programming
languages for security concerns has been an active research
topic for a long time. Denning and Denning [8] first use
program analysis to investigate if the information flow prop-
erties of a program satisfy a specified multi-level security
policy. Security type systems had been substantially used
to formulate the analysis of secure information flow in
programs. Specifically, our work is initially inspired by the
flow sensitive type system for programs in a simple While
language for multi-level security by Hunt and Sands [6].
In [6], sensitive information was stored in programming
variables, the powerset of program variables thus forms
the universal lattice. The flow-sensitive types system was
defined by a family of inference systems which is forced
to satisfy a simple non-interference property. Their recent
work [9] showed how flow-sensitive multi-level security
typing can be achieved in polynomial time. In addition to
type-based treatments of secure information flow analysis
for programs, Clarket. al presented a flow logic approach
in [10]. Hammer and Snelting [11] presented an approach
for information flow control in program analysis based on
program dependence graphs (PDG). Based on [11], [12]
extended the PDG-based flow analysis by incorporating
refinement techniques via path conditions to improve the
precision of the flow control. Such PDG-based information
flow control is more precise but more expensive than type-
based approaches. These works did not include treatments
on specification language and secure abstraction refinements.
A number of papers addresses flow analysis in Event-B.
Iliasov [13] introduced a method for control flow properties
in Event-B models. Theflow analysis in this paper focused
on expressions with event ordering and looked at the in-
terference between events introduced by a set of conditions
formulated on a machine. It can be used to express flow
properties for a model and to verify them using proofs.
Bendispostoet. al [14] proposed an automatic flow analysis
by deriving a flow graph structure from an Event-B model
specification. The derived graph contained information about
dependence and independence of events which can be used
for flow analysis and model comprehension.
In the context of refinement, Jocob [15] first pointed out
that secure information flow properties were not preserved
by the standard notion of refinement in general. There are
a number of papers addressed information flow security
and refinement. Heiselet. al developed acondition for
confidentiality-preserving renement in [16], [17]. The basic
idea was that the information allowed to be revealed by
the concrete system should also be allowed to be revealed
regarding to the abstract one. Aluret. al [18] presented a
framework for preservation of secrecy inlabelled transition
system, and introduced a simulation-based proof technique
for preserving secrecy under refinement. Mantel [19] pro-
posed a method for preserving information flow properties
under CSP-style renements regarding to anevent system.
The event system was considered as a tuple of a set of
input/output events and a set of traces. The idea here was
two fold: introducing refinement operators to refine specifi-
cations and then constructing secure refined event system
based on low equivalence relations. Mantel showed how
tailored renement operators for information flow properties
can construct a renement in which the resulting renement
preserves the given flow property. Bossiet. al [20] studied
the problem of preservation of information flow properties
underaction refinementin the context ofprocess algebra.
Seehusen and Stølen [21] introduced a schema to specify and
preserve secure information flow properties in the semantics
of STAIRS [22]. Jürjens [23] presented a framework for pre-
serving secrecy under refinement operators in specification
framework FOCUS [24]. In FOCUS, a process was modelled
by a total stream-processing function which mapped input
streams to sets of output streams. A process was consid-
ered preserving the secrecy if without eventually outputting
secrets. [23] presented a set ofconditions w.r.t. FOCUS
under which the refinements preserved proposed secrecy
properties. However, these works did not propose techniques
to define the program and refinement transformation which
ensures the preservation of secure flow properties as involved
in our paper. Comparing with these works, we have intro-
duced a sound and more general approach for secure flow
control in aspecification languageand for preservation of
secure flow properties under stepwise refinement by building
transformation and connection functions. We have presented
a framework to reason about security properties and relevant
relations of the stepwise refinement transformations.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper investigates the problem of preserving infor-
mation flow security in Event-B specification models and in
the process of refinement. We have introduced a framework
for reasoning about the secure flow property in Event-B and
under refinement. We present a security type system for a
core Event-B model with secure information flow control.
We then introduce a novel mechanism to preserve secure
information flow properties under abstraction refinement.
We make Galois connections between the abstract model
and the refined concrete ones for the purpose of flow
analysis and control. The Galois connection is generated
by the converse of the relations w.r.t. the predicates of
the models. The refinement function via Galois connection
ensures that the refinements preserve the security properties
during the development steps from the beginning abstract-
level specification to a concrete implementation. We also
study a set of security relationships between different levels
of abstract machines during the verticalrefinements.
We have presented a general framework for formal reason-
ing about preserving flow secrecy properties in a specifica-
tion language and the process of abstraction refinements. We
believe that the results presented in this paper is a promising
starting point for a comprehensive formal treatment of secu-
rity issues in specification languages and standard stepwis
refinements. For future work, we plan to investigate a logic
for the flow security properties and explore the relationship
between them. Another possibility is to define program
transformations in a way that guarantees the preservation
of flow security based on our framework.
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